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ABSTRACT: 
Using Two-stage Least Square (TSLS) regression for cross-sectional observations of 197 
countries for the year 2009, the study estimates the impact of the improvement in the quality of 
governance on per capita income and the increase in per capita income on the quality of 
governance. Following Kaufman and Kraay (2002) methodology, the results suggest a positive, 
strong statistically significant causation from quality of governance to per capita income. In 
addition, the results suggest a positive causation from per capita income to quality of 
governance. The estimation results are used to interpret the relationship between governance and 
growth for 22 MENA countries. A striking result suggests that despite the relatively low 
performance of most of these countries on almost all of the six measures of governance, their 
estimated levels of per capita of income are relatively higher than the rest of the countries in the 
sample.  This implies that most MENA countries have achieved a relatively high but fragile 
standard of living for their citizens that is not based on firm governance.  The fragility of 
standard of living in most these countries was manifested by the latest uprising in Tunisia 
followed by Egypt and Libya. The study has two policy implications; first development requires 
a strong intervention in improving governance and secondly, though to a lesser extent, improving 
governance requires an exogenous increase in income through multilateral aid for instance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
From the moment that the first protests erupted in Tunisia in December 2010, following the 
decision of a vegetable cart owner, Mohamed Bouazizi, to immolate himself over the 
confiscation of his cart and produce, economic grievances have played a pivotal role in fueling 
the wave of protests and uprisings in the Arab world that have already toppled the regimes of 
Tunisian former President Zine El Abedine Ben Ali and Egyptian former President Hosni 
Mubarak, and more recently Libyan President Muammar El Gaddafi, and have created serious 
political strife in Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria.  With the exception of oil and gas-rich Bahrain, 
where tensions have been exacerbated by an age-old divide between the country’s Shi’a majority 
and Sunni political and economic elite, every Arab nation whose political foundations have been 
seriously threatened over the last three months has a per capita income that places it squarely in 
middle or lower-income status – and often with high income inequality attached.  Popular anger 
over the economic mismanagement demonstrated by various autocratic Arab governments – and 
the poverty, unemployment, and limited options for upward mobility that have resulted from it – 
has arguably been as important a factor during the “Arab Spring” in uniting fractious societies in 
opposition to the status quo as the yearning for greater political freedoms. Likewise, one could 
argue that economic discontent, while far from the only motivating factor, has played a 
meaningful role in driving the protest movement in Iran in recent years. This paper considers the 
historical reasons cited for such failures of governance among MENA states, and seeks to assign 
relative levels of importance to each of these factors with regards to their harmful effect on both 
macroeconomic growth, and the actual economic opportunities available to the general populace 
of these nations. 
 By the standards of virtually any significant metric measuring the quality of governance 
in a particular country, the nations of MENA routinely rank well below the global average. The 
findings of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project provide perhaps 
the starkest evidence of the mismanagement and misrule produced by many of the region’s 
governments. The WGI project seeks to measure the quality of governance in a particular nation 
using six metrics: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. These metrics are measured both 
by a Governance Score that ranges from -2.5 to +2.5, and a Percentile Rank relative to nations 
worldwide. 
For the Voice and Accountability metric, 19 of the MENA region’s 20 largest countries 
by population were given a negative Governance Score, and ranked in the 36
th
 percentile or 
lower. 14 out of 20 ranked below the 25
th
 percentile. For the Political Stability metric, 13 out of 
20 ranked in the 41
st
 percentile or lower; and two of the nations ranked above the 50
th
 percentile 
(Tunisia and Libya) at the time of the project’s last report (2009) would likely see their rankings 
drop in an updated study. For the Government Effectiveness metric, 12 out of 20 nations had 
negative scores, and 5 out of 20 ranked below the 25
th
 percentile. For Regulatory Quality, 10 out 
of 20 had negative scores, and 5 out of 20 again ranked below the 25
th
 percentile. For Rule of 
Law, 11 out of 20 had negative scores, and 4 out of 20 ranked below the 25
th
 percentile. And for 
Control of Corruption, negative scores were given to 11 out of 20 nations, with 6 out of 20 
ranking below the 25
th
 percentile. 
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 Explanations for the failure of the governments of various MENA states to provide the 
kind of sound governance for their populations that can deliver strong economic growth and 
meaningful upward mobility have tended to fall into one of three categories: the implementation 
of misguided economic policies that provided government officials with an excessive amount of 
authority over the allocation of national resources, dating to the time of the Cold War; the 
presence of rampant corruption and cronyism throughout the organs of the state; and the lack of 
accountability caused by a dearth of democracy and political freedoms.  For impoverished states 
with little natural resource income relative to the size of their population, critiques of economic 
policy have revolved around the socialist, state-driven economic models adopted by many Arab 
governments from the 1950s onward. These models, with their emphasis on state control of 
major industries, the delegating of major resource-allocation decisions to central planners, and 
stringent controls on foreign trade and capital inflows, have been cited as a key reason why 
resource-poor Arab nations have failed to keep pace with countries possessing more market-
oriented economic policies. For nations awash in natural resource wealth, economic policy 
critiques have shined a light on both the harmful impact of heavy-handed state control by 
politicians and bureaucrats, and a general disinterest that’s often seen with regards to the 
development of export-oriented industries that are not tied to resource extraction. 
 The explanations for poor governance that center on institutional corruption, meanwhile, 
are often quick to point to international studies and rankings that give many MENA states poor 
marks with regards to corruption and government transparency.  The harmful impact of the 
widespread need for bribes and kickbacks on both the cultivation of domestic industry and the 
attracting of foreign investment is well-documented, as is the effect of lucrative business deals 
and favorable regulatory treatment being provided to the cronies and family members of 
prominent government officials.  And researchers have noted that the lack of political liberty not 
only prevents autocrats and their underlings from being held accountable for their poor economic 
judgment, by means of elections, but also prevents critics and whistleblowers from pointing out 
government incompetence, corruption, and malfeasance to their fellow countrymen. 
 Considering the impact that the embrace of market reforms, and their implicit reduction 
of the economic authority of government officials, has had on many developing economies 
throughout the world, it is not difficult to argue that questionable decision-making by 
government authorities in MENA countries with statist economic systems has been a major 
detriment to economic growth. In her paper, Parameters of Economic Reform in North Africa, 
Karen Pfeifer takes account of the economic damage done to Tunisia by its bloated, inefficient 
public sector enterprises (PSEs), which grew in number from 25 in the 1960s to 400 by 1989 
(448), and the government diktats that kept them in this state. With PSEs “assigned objectives 
other than profit-maximization such as producing import substitutes...and not free to fire workers 
or raise prices,” their losses ended up accounting for 20% of government outlays between 1977 
and 1981 (449). The failures of Tunisia’s PSEs, and the laws that left them in a particularly 
woeful state, undoubtedly played a large role in Tunisia’s GDP per capita growth declining from 
an annual rate of 5.1% from 1970-1980 to merely 1.1% from 1980-1990 (449). 
Egypt was also criticized by Pfeifer for its heavy-handed support of PSEs. In Egypt’s 
case, not only did massive state investment in PSEs have a detrimental effect on the domestic 
economy due to their inefficiency, they required enormous imports of capital, technology, and 
other inputs in order to function – thereby ironically thwarting the Egyptian government’s stated 
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goal of import substitution.  Moreover, as the Egyptian government officials took an active role 
in managing quantities and prices for various inputs and outputs, Pfeifer notes that “central 
planning became very complex” (442).  After achieving 5.7% annual growth from 1970-1980, 
Egypt’s per capita GDP grew only 2.4% per year from 1980-1990, and declined by 0.5% per 
year from 1990-1995. As with many other developing economies, a state-driven approach to 
industrializing what was initially a predominantly agrarian economy yielded healthy economic 
growth at first, but then witnessed increasingly diminishing returns due to inefficient capital 
spending and general mismanagement. 
That corruption and arbitrary rule-enforcement is widespread and deeply institutionalized 
in many MENA countries is undeniable. Relying on ten indicators from several major think 
tanks, economist Tarik M. Yousef sought to compare “Institutional Quality,” which measures 
factors such as corruption, the size of the black market, the enforcement of rules and rights, and 
the quality of bureaucracy, in the OECD and six different sets of developing nations, sorted by 
geography. In Yousef’s study, found in his 2004 paper Development, Growth and Policy Reform 
in the Middle East and North Africa since 1950, the MENA region was given an Institutional 
Quality score of -0.32 – ahead of only South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, and well behind the 
OECD, which had a score of 1.38 (98). To make matters worse, with a score of -0.78, the MENA 
region ranked last (by far) in Yousef’s rankings of “Public Accountability,” which measured 
factors such as political participation, civil liberties, and government transparency and 
responsiveness. OECD nations, by contrast, reported a score of 1.89 (98). Needless to say, 
Yousef’s findings dovetail very well with the WGI project’s ratings of MENA nations in the 
areas of Voice and Accountability, Regulatory Quality, and Government Effectiveness. 
However, the endemic corruption found within many governments cannot merely be 
attributed to the failings of autocratic governments: in many situations, cultural factors also 
appear to play an important role. In his paper, Expecting the Unexpected: The Cultural 
Components of Arab Governance, Lawrence Rosen remarks that “Arabs tend to characterize 
corruption not as abuse of some formal set of criteria associated with a given position but as the 
failure to share whatever largesse comes one's way with those to whom one has forged ties of 
obligation” (171). Rosen goes on to note how certain informants of his half-jokingly remarked 
that “corruption is our form of democracy,” since it allows individuals to disregard an autocrat’s 
rules in exchange for a bribe. Thus, “corruption” can sometimes take on a whole different 
meaning than what it is typically viewed as in the West, with the Western concept of corruption 
being sometimes tolerated, depending on the circumstances. And so, while potentially 
detrimental to economic growth, corruption in the Western sense of the term could remain in 
place to some extent even if political elites show a commitment to clean, transparent 
government. 
The historical “democracy deficit” of the MENA states has clearly kept many autocrats 
(and until recently, a couple of others) from being held accountable for their failure to deliver 
economic growth, as well as major improvement in other human development indicators. The 
chilling effect of the broader lack of political freedoms in a number of countries in the region, as 
manifested by the widespread reports of journalists, writers, and activists being arrested and/or 
beaten, has also contributed to the lack of accountability for poor governance, as many potential 
critics are frightened into silence, lest they run afoul of the state.  And on a micro level, evidence 
appears to exist that a lack of political freedom has a strongly negative effect on the governing 
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competence of the state. In their paper, Civil Liberties, Democracy, and the Performance of 
Government Projects, Jonathan Isham, Daniel Kaufmann, and Lant H. Pritchett sought to 
examine the relative effectiveness of World Bank-financed government projects in nations that 
do and don’t possess civil liberties, human rights achievement, media pluralism, and the freedom 
to organize, after controlling for economic, project, and regional variables.  While the study 
found little relationship between the freedom to organize and performance, it found a moderately 
positive relationship with human rights achievement, and a highly positive relationship with civil 
liberties and media pluralism (229-230). 
Given the evidence, sound arguments exist for all three of the analyzed factors – unsound 
economics doctrines, rampant corruption, and a lack of political accountability – having a 
harmful effect on the quality of governance in MENA countries, and thereby damaging 
economic growth. But at first glance at least, economic policy appears to be the largest culprit, 
given that it can be harmful not only in its own right, but to the extent that it can aggravate the 
other two factors. Given the extent of the cultural roots of corruptions in many MENA nations, it 
could be argued that the most effective solution for minimizing its economic impact is to migrate 
away from a centrally-planned economy and thereby eliminate the power of fallible government 
officials to “manage” the economy. And to the extent that misguided economic policies can stunt 
socioeconomic development, they can also inhibit a variety of factors (higher education levels, a 
more developed civil society, greater exposure to the outside world) that serve to increase the 
demand for political reform. Thus, while the effects of an improved economic policy on the 
general quality of governance may vary tremendously from nation to nation, its positive ripple 
effects are likely to be considerable. 
 
II. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION  
 
The main focus of this section is to estimate the causal effect of governance on per capita 
income. The model is first estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two-stages Least 
Squares (TSLS). The model is estimated using cross-sectional data on 197 countries in 2009. 
Next the estimation results are used to interpret the relationship between governance and growth 
for 22 MENA1 countries. 
Following Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), equation (1) below provides a parsimonious 
specification of the model; 
 
iii egovpgdp   ,                                (1)   
Where pgdp is the log per capita income, gov is governance, e represents all the other 
factors not included in this parsimonious equation, and finally the subscripts i represents the 
cross sections, or countries.  
The above model is complemented with the following equation;  
                                                          
1
 Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. 
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ii
ugovgov i 
*
                                                              (2) 
Where *gov refers to the observed governance which is a noisy measure of actual 
governance and with a measurement error u. The measurement error is assumed to have a zero 
mean and variance 2u . 
The main aim of the model above is to estimate the impact of governance on per capita 
income over the long run. The governance indicator covers six main areas of governance 
including voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, 
regulatory quality, and control of corruption. Accordingly, equation (1) above is estimated six 
times for each type of governance in a turn. 
The second part of the empirical model aims at estimating the reverse causality, the impact of 
income per capita on governance. This relationship is represented by equation (3) as follows; 
ii ii
xpgdpgov                                       (3) 
Where gov and pgdp are as defined above and x represents geographic location measured in 
latitudes. Similar to e in equation (1) above,   is the measurement error term with zero mean 
and a variance 2v   and it captures all other factors not included in this simple parsimonious 
model. Following Kauffman and Kraay (2002), it is assumed that the error terms, or the omitted 
variables, of equations (1) and (3) could be correlated together such that veveE  ..].[   and 
this allows for the possibility that other factors affecting income per capita could be related with 
other factors affecting governance.  
Finally, as in equation (2) above, the observed level of per capita income  
*
i
pgdp   is a noisy 
measure of actual per capita income such that;   
ii wpgdppgdp i 
*
.                                     (4) 
                         where w refers to the measurement error with zero mean and variance 2w  
The leading study by Acemoglu et al. (2003) uses settler mortality as an instrument for 
institutions assuming that higher settler mortality in a country is an indication of bad 
institutions. Hall and Jones (1999) have used colonial origin measured by the percentage of the 
population speaking a major European language. Kaufman and Kraay (2002) in their sample of 
156 countries, use tropical location and colonial origin to impute the missing values of 
Acemoglu’s settler mortality data that is only available for 56 countries. Moreover, Easterly and 
Levine (2003) find that tropics, germs, and crops have an indirect effect on development that 
passes through institutions. 
Based on previous empirical literature on institutions, geographic location or tropical 
location is proved to be correlated with the level of governance and can be assumed as an 
exogenous variable in equation (3), or not correlated with other factors affecting per capita GDP 
of equation (1). Accordingly, without going through the relevance and exogeneity tests it is fair 
to assume that x is a valid instrument for governance. 
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II. DATA 
 
 The data set consist of cross-sectional observations for 197 countries for the latest 
available data on governance in 2009. The parsimonious model under study includes economic 
growth as the dependent variable measured as the log of per capita GDP (constant 2000 US$) 
and taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank database. Data on 
the six areas of governance including voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption are all taken from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) project, World Bank database and constructed by Kaufman, Aary, 
and Massimo (2012). Finally, data on latitudes were taken from the CEPII research center 
databases2. 
 
IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
  
 The main aim of the model represented in equation (1) is to estimate the impact of 
different areas of governance on economic growth. The equation was estimated six times with 
the log of per capita GDP as the dependent variable each time and the six types of governance as 
regressors each one in a turn. Table (1) below shows the results of estimating equation (1) using 
both the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as well as Two-stage Least Squares (TSLS). In line with 
previous empirical research, our results confirm the positive impact of improving governance on 
log of per capita GDP. All the coefficients show a positive and a statistical significant impact of 
governance on economic growth. For instance, using OLS Column (1) shows that a one standard 
deviation increase in regulatory quality measure increases per capita income by nearly threefold 
in the very long run. Similar magnitude is shown for the impact of rule of law measure on per 
capita income.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (EPII)  http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/bdd.htm 
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              Table 1: The Causal Effect of Governance on Income Per Capita 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        Notes: The dependent variable is log per capita GDP. The table summarizes the results of  
                                                        running six different regressions.  The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors. 
 
 Using country latitudes as the selected instrument, Column (2) of Table (1) shows the 
results of the TSLS. Two things to notice about the results; first the signs of all the six 
governance measures are positive and statistically significant confirming the results of the OLS. 
Secondly, in line with Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), the estimated coefficients of the TSLS are 
larger than the OLS. For instance, using the TSLS, the impact of one standard deviation increase 
in the rule of law measure leads to an eightfold increase in per capita income in the very long run 
as compared with only a threefold increase using OLS. 
Regressors Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(1) 
Two-stage Least 
Squares 
(2) 
Intercept 7.932 
(0.091) 
7.987 
(0.199) 
Voice and 
Accountability 
0.992 
(0.093) 
3.422 
(1.168) 
No. of observation 189 189 
2R  0.38 0.38 
Intercept 7.938 
(0.091) 
8.025 
(0.248) 
Political Stability 1.037 
(0.095) 
4.256 
(1.789) 
No. of observation 189 189 
2R  0.39 0.39 
Intercept 7.883 
(0.065) 
7.880 
(0.071) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
1.353 
(0.067) 
1.747 
(0.217) 
No. of observation 188 188 
2R  0.69 0.63 
Intercept 7.868 
(0.074) 
7.859 
(0.079) 
Regulatory 
Quality 
1.279 
(0.077) 
1.660 
(0.230) 
No. of observation 188 188 
2R  0.59 0.54 
Intercept 7.929 
(0.068) 
7.936 
(0.077) 
Rule of Law 1.327 
(0.070) 
1.836 
(0.244) 
No. of observation 189 189 
2R  0.66 0.56 
Intercept 7.894 
(0.078) 
7.891 
(0.110) 
Control of 
Corruption 
1.178 
(0.079) 
2.242 
(0.434) 
No. of observation 188 188 
2R  0.55 0.10 
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 The second part of this section is concerned with estimating the reverse causality from 
per capita income to governance. The main idea behind this estimation is to check whether the 
increase in income can lead to a better improvement in governance or not. By observing the 
performance of developed countries for instance, it is expected that countries with high income 
levels are also able to buy high quality governance. Table 2 below shows the results of 
estimating equation (3) six times with each governance indicator as the dependent variable in a 
turn and per capita income and latitudes as independent variables. For the sake of brevity, 
column (1) of the table below shows the estimates of   in equation (3). As obvious from the 
results, the increase in per capita income has a positive and a statistically significant impact on 
all governance measures. For instance, if an economy is to double its per capita income, it can 
increase the voice and accountability measure by about 0.28 points. Similarly, doubling per 
capita income leads to around 0.34 increases in government effectiveness measure3.  
The results of the reverse causality suggest that there is also a feedback from income to 
governance. An exogenous increase in income, from multilateral aids for instance, leads to better 
governance. Thus the results suggest the presence of simultaneous causality between income and 
governance such that economic growth feeds in enhanced institutions. 
 
                        
            Table 2: The Causal Effect of Income Per Capita on Governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                     Notes: The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors. 
 Given the fact that finding an instrument for per capita GDP is not an easy task, 
Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) 4 methodology is used to infer the slope of the effect of income on 
governance indirectly through comparison of OLS and IV results. 
Using sample information, the parameters  ,  ,   and 2v  of the reverse causality 
(equation 3) are estimated using the estimated intercepts, slopes, and variance of the error terms 
of the first and second stage regressions of the impact of governance on income. To do this, 
                                                          
3
 Doubling per capita income implies computing log (2) which is equal to 0.69, then multiplied by the  coefficient 
of equation (3). 
4 More details on the model are available on Kaufmann and Kraay (2002)
 
 paper. 
Dependent Variables Ordinary Least 
Squares 
No. of  
observations 
2R  
Voice and Accountability 0.380 
(0.036) 
189 0.38 
Political Stability 0.377 
(0.034) 
189 0.39 
Government Effectiveness 0.510 
(0.025) 
188 0.69 
Regulatory Quality 0.465 
(0.028) 
188 0.59 
Rule of Law 0.497 
(0.026) 
189 0.66 
Control of Corruption 0.464 
(0.031) 
188 0.55 
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Equations 4 and 5 of Kaufmann and Kraay (2002)  are written in a reduced form in terms of 
observables as shown below, 
 
iiiii uvexg 
 )..()1( 1*                (5) 
iiiii wvexy 
 ).()1( 1*            (6) 
                                
iiiii wuegy  
**                                            (7) 
Solving the above three equations with variances and covariances, Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) 
get the following three parameters, 
  





11
^
                            (8) 
2
222^
1
22
2 u
vvee 


 


                                           (9) 
2222222
2222^
)1(2
)1(
uvevex
vevex
OLS 




         (10) 
  
Where 
1
  is the slope coefficient of the first stage regression, 
OLS
  is the slope coefficient of the OLS 
regression of log per capita GDP on governance, and 
2
2  is the variance of the residual of the first 
stage regression of governance on the instrument x or the latitude variable. Finally the intercept 
coefficient,  , of the reverse causality regression can be computed from the estimated coefficient 
as equal to   )]1([
^
0
. For convenience, the definitions of all parameters are shown in 
Table 3 below. 
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Table 3: Definitions of Parameters 
Parameter Definition 
 and,,  Intercept, income slope, geographic location slope of Equation 2. Those three intercepts 
we need to find them using other parameters, or sample information. 
2
v  
Variance of the error term of Equation 2. 
 ,  Intercept and slope respectively of the second-stage regression (Equation 1) 
  Correlation between the error terms in equation (1) and ( 3). Estimated to range from 
 -0.20 to 0.20 
2
e  Variance of the residual of the second stage regression which, from Equation 7, is equal 
to 2222
wue    
2
u  Variance of the measurement error in governance (From the data rule of law index has a 
standard deviation equal to 0.17). Parameters are estimated using a range from 0.17 to 
0.34 
2
w  Variance of the measurement error in log per capita GDP, assumed equal to 0.20 
10 ,  Intercept and slope of the first stage regression of governance on the instrument x, or the 
latitude variable. 
2
2  
Variance of the residual of the first stage regression of governance on the instrument x or 
the latitude variable. 
OLS  Slope coefficient of the OLS regression of log per capita GDP on governance. 
2
x  Variance of the instrument or the variance of the latitude variable 
  Source: Author research  
Having equations (8) through (10) at hand and assuming values for the variance of the 
measurement error in governance, 2
u , and the correlation between the error terms of equation 
(1) and (3),  , the parameters  ,   and 2v  can be estimated as shown in Tables 4 and 5 below. 
  Following Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), given the high correlation between the rule of 
law index and the other governance indicators, it is used in running the experiments below. From 
the data, the rule of law index has a standard deviation, uRL , equal to 0.17. As shown in Table 4, 
the first experiment is run assuming a range for uRL  from 0.17 to 0.34 holding the coefficient 
  constant at zero.  
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Table 4: Estimating the Coefficients of the Second Stage Regression (holding 0 )  
Estimated Parameters Assigned Values To uRL  
0  0.17 0.198 0.226 0.254 0.282 0.310 0.34 
  0.1056 0.0984 0.0915 0.0847 0.0784 0.0724 0.0658 
  0.0153 0.0151 0.0149 0.0148 0.0146 0.0145 0.0143 
v  1.0204 1.0227 1.0258 1.0298 1.0347 1.0404 1.0470 
 Source: Author calculation 
The results of Table 4 show that holding   constant at zero, over the range of values for 
uRL  the impact of the log of per capita GDP on the governance indicator is positive though with 
a small magnitude. In other words, as the measurement error in the rule of law index increases 
from 0.17 to 0.34, the impact of per capita income on governance decreases from about 0.11 to 
0.07. Furthermore, as the measurement error in rule of law increases, the impact of geography on 
governance, , decreases and the variance of the error term, v , increases. 
Next the second experiment is undertaken assuming hypothetical values for  , ranging 
from -0.20 to 0.20, holding uRL  constant at 0.17. As shown in Table 5, the higher the correlation 
between the error terms of the per capita income equation and the governance equation, the 
higher is the estimated magnitude of per capita income on governance, the higher is the 
estimated impact of geography on governance, and the higher is the variance of the error term. 
 
Table 5: Estimating the Coefficients of the Second Stage Regression (holding 17.0uRL )  
Assigned Values To   
17.0uRL  -0.20 -0.10 0 0.10 0.20 
  0.0147 0.0590 0.1056 0.1560 0.2121 
  0.0131 0.0142 0.0153 0.0165 0.0178 
v  0.9623 0.9864 1.0204 1.0663 1.1271 
Source: Author’s calculation    
The calibrated results of Tables 4 and 5 confirm that the reverse causality from per capita 
income to governance is positive, and as expected, the magnitudes are much smaller than the 
estimates of Table 2 using OLS. According to the estimates of Table 2, the effect of per capita 
income on the different areas of governance ranges from 0.38 for the voice and accountability 
index, to 0.510 for the government effectiveness index. Comparing these magnitudes to the 
calibrated results, if we assume that the measurement error in the rule of law index is at its 
assumed highest value of 0.34, the impact of per capita income on governance is still positive 
reaching a minimum of 0.0658. In addition, in worst case scenario when the correlation between 
the error terms reaches its highest at 0.20 the impact of per capita income on governance does 
not exceed 0.2121.  
Comparing the results of the estimation versus the calibration of the reverse causality, the 
results of the estimation, Table 2, suggest that an exogenous doubling income leads to about 0.35 
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increase in the rule of law index while the calibration suggests that the increase in the index 
ranges from 0.04 to 0.07 depending on the degree of this index measurement error, and ranges 
from 0.01 to 0.15 depending on the degree of correlation between the error terms of equations (1) 
and (3). In any case, the calibration showed that the results of Table (2) are picking up the 
simultaneous causality between the per capita income and governance such that the factors 
affecting per capita income are also affecting governance. Furthermore, the calibration of the 
parameters show that increasing per capita income has a relatively small impact on improving 
governance, represented by the rule of law. This implies, depending on income only to improve 
governance in developing countries is not enough but a direct intervention in improving 
governance is required. 
 
V. Per Capita Income and Governance in MENA countries 
 
Most MENA countries have low levels of governance for their per capita income levels. 
In other words, with their given governance levels, MENA countries are performing above the 
average income levels for all countries in the sample. Using the estimated coefficients for 
Equation (3), the income effect, geography effect, and the effect of other factors are computed in 
Table (6) of the appendix. As the table shows, the income effect is positive, implying a one unit 
increase in the log of GDP per capita improves governance. Similarly the geography effect is 
positive for all MENA countries, as expected. The effect of other factors ranges from positive to 
negative impacts on governance. 
The results of Table (6) of the appendix are graphically represented in Figure (1) below, 
where the impact of income and geography on rule of law, as a proxy for governance, is 
estimated. As shown on the bar chart, the impact of income on governance is positive for all 
MENA countries where the share of income in explaining governance was the highest for 
Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Israel. 
Furthermore, Figure (1) shows that the impact of geography on governance is positive 
with the highest impact in Turkey, Tunisia, Algeria, Malta, and Iran. Finally, the combined effect 
of other factors such as culture, life expectancy, population size, trade openness, peace years, 
unemployment rate, and exchange rate on governance ranges between positive and negative 
impacts with the highest positive impact in Malta and Iraq, and highest negative impact in Egypt.  
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Figure 1 
Estimating Reverse Causality in MENA Countries 
 
 
Figures 2 through 4 show the estimation of log per capita income regression on the six 
governance measures with a 95% confidence interval. Concerning the voice and accountability 
measure, as is obvious from the graph on the left of Figure 2, almost all MENA states lie above 
the average estimated income per capita for all the countries in the sample. This is very obvious 
for countries such as Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. Few countries in 
the MENA region performed below the average of the 197 countries in the sample in terms of 
the voice and accountability measure. More specifically, only three countries out of the 22 
MENA countries, namely Djibouti, Iraq, and Yemen, lie below the regression line. Similarly, 
with the exception of Djibouti and Yemen, most of the MENA states lie above the average of the 
197 countries in terms of political stability measure. 
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Figure 2: Voice & Accountability and Political Stability MENA countries 
 
 
 
A striking feature of this figure suggests that except for only two countries, namely Cyprus and 
Israel, all of the MENA countries have a voice and accountability measure below zero. 
Moreover, except for Libya, Oman, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates, all countries are around 
the zero political stability no violence measure. This feature suggests that for many MENA 
countries, the estimated high per capita income is derived from sources other than firm 
governance.  
 Next concerning government effectiveness, as Figure 3 shows except for four countries 
namely Cyprus Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, all the MENA states perform on or above the 
fitted per capita regression line. A country such as Libya with a low measure of government 
effectiveness performs far above the average of the sample given its per capita income. 
Similarly, regarding the regulatory quality measure, Libya is far above the average of the sample 
given its per capita income, while countries such as Egypt, Tunis, and Yemen perform relatively 
below the average at their per capita income level compared to all the countries in the sample. 
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Figure 3: Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality in MENA countries 
 
 
 
Next, regarding the performance of MENA countries in the rule of law measure, as 
obvious from the left panel of Figure 4, despite the fact that only ten countries in the MENA 
region score above zero on the rule of law measure, the majority of the sample perform above the 
fitted regression line. For example, countries such as Lebanon and Libya with a rule of law score 
of only -0.63 and -0.75 respectively are performing well above the regression line.  
 
Figure 4: Rule of Law and Corruption in MENA countries 
 
DZA
BHR
CYP
DJI
EGY
IRN
IRQ
ISR
JOR
KWT
LBN
LBY
MAR
OMN
QAT
SAU
SYR
TUN
TUR
ARE
WBG
YEM
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
L
o
g
 P
e
r 
C
a
p
it
a
 G
D
P
 (
c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
2
0
0
0
 U
S
$
)
-2 -1 0 1 2
Government Effectiveness
DZA
BHR
CYP
DJI
EGY
IRN
IRQ
ISR
JOR
KWT
LBN
LBY
MAR
OMN
QAT
SAU
SYR
TUN
TUR
ARE
WBG
YEM
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
L
o
g
 P
e
r 
C
a
p
it
a
 G
D
P
 (
c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
2
0
0
0
 U
S
$
)
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2
Regulatory Quality
DZA
BHR
CYP
DJI
EGY
IRN
IRQ
ISR
JOR
KWT
LBN
LBY
MAR
OMN
QAT
SAU
SYR
TUN
TUR
ARE
WBG
YEM
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
L
o
g
 P
e
r 
C
a
p
it
a
 G
D
P
 (
c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
2
0
0
0
 U
S
$
)
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2
Rule of Law
DZA
BHR
CYP
DJI
EGY
IRN
IRQ
ISR
JOR
KWT
LBN
LBY
MAR
OMN
QAT
SAU
SYR
TUN
TUR
ARE
WBG
YEM
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
L
o
g
 P
e
r 
C
a
p
it
a
 G
D
P
 (
c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
2
0
0
0
 U
S
$
)
-2 -1 0 1 2
Corruption
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies 
Vol. 16, No. 2, September 2014 
180 
 
 
Finally, despite the fact that almost half of the MENA countries are performing poorly on the 
corruption measure, only five countries (namely Djibouti, Jordan, Morocco, West Bank and 
Gaza and Yemen) are performing below the regression line. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
A variety of factors have been responsible for the failure of the governments of various 
MENA states to provide the kind of sound governance for their populations that can deliver 
strong economic growth and meaningful upward mobility. As previously noted, the largest of 
these factors include the implementation of misguided economic policies that distorted resource 
allocation; rampant corruption and cronyism; and a general lack of accountability caused in large 
part by a shortage of democracy and political freedom.   
Nonetheless, in spite of these crippling factors, numerous MENA countries have 
estimated per capita income levels that are above the estimated average for the 197 countries in 
the sample. This implies that many MENA countries have achieved a relatively high standard of 
living for their citizens thanks to other factors, such as an abundance of natural resources. Libya, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, and United Arab Emirates depend on oil exports as their 
main source of income. Meanwhile, major sources of income for Egypt include tourism, 
remittances from Egyptians working abroad, revenues from the Suez Canal, and oil. Progress 
towards the formation of democratic institutions that could produce greater government 
accountability, as well as a more stable foundation for an elevated standard of living, has been 
very slow in most MENA countries, with citizens enjoying relatively limited amounts of social, 
economic, and political freedom. A fragile standard of living, easily upended by economic 
shocks such as rising food costs, was a key factor behind the Tunisian, Egyptian, and Libyan 
uprisings. 
The main implication of this study is that strong efforts are needed within MENA 
countries to improve the quality and effectiveness of regulatory mechanisms; to bring down 
corruption levels, to strengthen the rule of law, to achieve political stability and reduce internal 
violence; and to make governments more accountable to their own citizens. Furthermore, an 
exogenous increase in income – through multilateral aid, for instance – will feed in better 
governance. A future extension of this study will work on testing the effect of multilateral aid in 
improving governance in the MENA countries. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 6 
 List of MENA Countries in the Sample 
 
country Code 
1 Algeria DZA 
2 Bahrain BHR 
3 Cyprus CYP 
4 Djibouti DJI 
5 Egypt EGY 
6 Iran IRN 
7 Iraq IRQ 
8 Israel ISR 
9 Jordan JOR 
10 Kuwait KWT 
11 Lebanon LBN 
12 
Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya LBY 
13 Malta MLT 
14 Morocco MAR 
15 Oman OMN 
16 Qatar QAT 
17 Saudi Arabia SAU 
18 Syrian Arab Republic SYR 
19 Tunisia TUN 
20 Turkey TUR 
21 
United Arab 
Emirates ARE 
22 Yemen YEM 
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Table 7: Estimating the Reverse Causality Regression for MENA countries Using Sample Information 
Countries 
Per-Capita 
Income 
Geography 
(Latitude) 
Estimated Rule of 
Law 
Estimated Error 
Term 
ALGERIA 
0.708 0.656 -0.482 0.250 
BAHRAIN 
0.901 0.466 -0.479 0.029 
DJIBOUTI 
0.887 0.626 -0.333 0.830 
EGYPT 
0.627 0.206 -1.012 -0.363 
IRAN 
0.694 0.535 -0.616 -0.590 
IRAQ 
0.708 0.635 -0.503 0.398 
ISRAEL 
0.609 0.593 -0.643 1.187 
JORDAN 
0.920 0.571 -0.354 0.479 
KUWAIT 
0.721 0.569 -0.556 -0.178 
LEBANON 
0.996 0.522 -0.327 0.263 
LIBYA 
0.806 0.603 -0.437 0.199 
MALTA 
0.824 0.583 -0.439 0.314 
MOROCCO 
0.855 0.639 -0.352 1.159 
OMAN 
0.689 0.606 -0.550 -0.393 
QATAR 
0.933 0.420 -0.492 0.191 
SAUDI ARABIA 
0.972 0.449 -0.424 0.535 
SYRIA 
0.847 0.439 -0.560 -0.436 
TUNISIA 
0.668 0.596 -0.581 -0.115 
UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES 
0.731 0.656 -0.459 -0.240 
YEMEN 
0.780 0.730 -0.335 -0.213 
Source: Author calculation 
 
